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The Ethics of the Other
Introduction
I consider that our society is going through a globalization process where different
systems are being questioned by the presence of other perspectives. This process has revealed
the flaws of our traditional moral systems where conflicts were solved through a belief system
that had been proved and accepted by the majority of the individuals of a given society.
However, since an inclusive global society needs to incorporate different beliefs systems into
its moral considerations, and this implies a clash between the different moral codes that exist
in different cultures, we need to find a way where persons establish an ethical relation with
each other regardless of the endorsement of a system. In my thesis I propose that Levinas’
philosophy is the best alternative to build this ethical relationship between the I and the other.
In the first chapter I will analyze Levinas’ idea of Ethics as first philosophy, as well as the way
language is affected by this ethical need. After I analyze Levinas’ ideas I will move to the
second chapter where we will see that the admission of diversity is vital to have a better
knowledge of the world and with this we can achieve a well‐rounded life. In the third chapter I
also use Antonio Caso’s philosophies to support Levinas’ position that contrary to an
individualistic society‐‐where individual independence is of the highest importance‐‐
interdependency between the I and the other is necessary for it is in this ethical relationship
where the individual freely becomes himself. The last chapter of my thesis is a sketch of my
ideas of the relationship between the I and the other. In this chapter I propose that the other
plays a more active role than just questioning the I. I argue that the other, understood here as
the person that does not fit mainstream society, is an active member of society that is not only
1

a form of resistance to any attempt to totalize him, but has his own identity. He uses this
identity to support the idea of diversity as opposed to standardization, as the best way to
create a society where a person can achieve a well‐rounded life.

2

Chapter I: Levinas’ Philosophy
1.1 Ethics as First Philosophy
In his essay “Ethics as First Philosophy” (EFP 77) Levinas presents us with his answer to
the question of the meaning of being: the ethical responsibility to the face of the other.
Levinas says that a direct responsibility is gained from the Other by recognition of his visage.
This assertion is a result of Levinas distancing himself from Husserl’s transcendental idealism
and Heidegger’s hermeneutics. It is possible that this placement of total responsibility for the
Other on the I was partially his personal response to the horrors of the Holocaust, but he was
also contending Husserl’s phenomenological case of making intentionality the ultimate
meaning‐giver of the world. Levinas instead proposes Ethics to be the first philosophy.
Levinas critiques Husserl’s position by saying that it creates a circular situation that
soon would require the I to isolate itself from the otherness of the world in such a way that
does not value different perspectives. A prime example lies in contemporary philosophy
wherein it is a rarity for philosophers to study or even know about Mexican philosophy or
philosophical traditions other than Continental and analytic philosophies. With this in mind, it
is not difficult to accept Levinas’ argument that a person shapes the world from a limited
perspective; every conceptualization of the world obeys his ideas of how the world is in such a
way that the identical and non‐identical are identified, leading him to a position where he
intentionality defines the objects of his consciousness. In other words, the world and the
people of which it consists are mere objects at the mercy of the consciousness of the I. If the I
perceives an object to be an extension of his being, then he has ownership of the object. The
only parameter that the I has to evaluate the soundness of his proposition is his own
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conception of this relationship. He does not establish this as a conversation between equals
for the other is objectified and should thus surrender to his will. There is no room for the other
to have a voice in this definition. It is clear to see that his propositions will always be confirmed
for he is asking and responding to himself, creating in this way the circle that Levinas cautions
against.
Levinas also attacks Husserl’s argument that the independence self‐consciousness has
from the world should prove it as the master of the universe that can impose power upon
anything that resists. As we will see later, Levinas says that there is a non‐intentional
consciousness that prevents intentionality from being the first philosophy, but for the moment
allow me to focus on his critique of Husserl’s conception of intentionality as first philosophy.
As I said before, for Husserl the idea that consciousness does not depend on the world to
confirm its existence because it is able to think about itself, as in being conscious of his
consciousness‐ confirms the supremacy of consciousness over the world. Levinas says that this
“transcendental reduction suspends all independence of the world other than that of self‐
consciousness, and causes the world to be rediscovered as noema” (EFP 79). In other words,
the I gives meaning to the world under the mask of the pursuit of truth and conceives the
world as an object waiting to receive an interpretation. For us to know objects, we essentially
bestow their state of being. However, by virtue of this mere act, the otherness loses itself into
the knowledge and the apprehension that the I now has of it.
As we have seen, under Husserl’s conception, self‐consciousness would be the first
philosophy; the way we approach and apprehend the world. Under this principle of self‐
consciousness as a meaning giver, a person is entitled to make the first contact with the other
4

and surrender him to his own catories. The other is totalized by the conceptualization that the
I makes of him with the obvious risks this may carry. Levinas argues that if “the wisdom of first
philosophy is reduced to self‐consciousness … [and] the labor of thought wins over the
otherness of things and men” (EFP, 78), we will be in danger because that is to admit the idea
that a person who considers self‐consciousness the ultimate meaning‐giver of the world has
the right to totalize other people under his own categories. Furthermore, I would argue that
once we accept the principle that the I’s intentionality is the supreme ruler of the world, the I
would be self‐ justified, and may reject the idea of the other as a subject with dignity and value
by himself. This in consequence will reduce the other to a mere object of the I’s self‐
consciousness. This thought may lead the I to think that he has the right to do what he pleases
with other people and the world, and has no need for an ethical code to justify or constrain his
conduct. As we will see later, Levinas does not maintain that this ethical code is to be
expressed in laws or social pacts; it is unconstrained by time. This is to say that the ethical duty
to the other does not depend on an agreement that we may reach as in social pact theories or
is forced upon us by the laws of a nation. Our ethical duty is there even before we or our
civilization were born. This responsibility made apparent by the other is in fact the place where
we start to build our own presence in the world.
In addition to the risks already elucidated by Levinas, there is yet another reason to not
consider intentionality the ultimate decision maker. This reason is non‐intentional
consciousness. For Levinas, there is the question of “whether, beneath the gaze of reflected
consciousness taken as self consciousness, the non intentional, experienced as the
counterpoint to the intentional, does not conserve and free its true meaning” (EFP 80). This
5

non‐intentional consciousness becomes part of the world, yet it is only an essence of what
could have been otherwise, and that which is never realized. It is not an integral part of a
world; the world can exist without its presence. In other words non‐intentional consciousness
never comes to be; it never becomes part of the beings. This consciousness turns to itself,
analyzes itself, becoming a consciousness of its own consciousness, confirming in this way its
independence, taking control of the first intentionality. However, this consciousness of
consciousness never becomes intentional, for that will constitute the same mistake that
Husserl makes in his argument; this reduced consciousness “also remains a non‐intentional
consciousness of itself, as though it were a surplus somehow devoid of any willful aim…
unknowingly as knowledge, as a non‐ objectifying knowledge” (EFP 79). Allow me to elaborate
in this Levinas’ deep concept; as we have seen, non‐intentional consciousness remains passive
and does not play a role in the apprehension of the world. On the contrary, it becomes the
guide that reveals to the I his incapacity to obtain a complete knowledge of the world, or to
objectify it. Since non‐intentional consciousness never comes to be, it cannot be apprehended
by the I’s intentionality, consequently the I fails to have full knowledge of the world. This
situation undermines Husserl’s argument that because intentionality provides a complete
image of the world to the I, then it must be the first philosophy. Now we can see that, as
established before, non‐intentional consciousness is the darkness that cannot be illuminated
by the light of the I’s intentionality in the form of language or any other form for that matter.
In this way the I is forced to recognize that he cannot fully know the world and needs to be
humble to the presence of the other who cannot offer the I a full picture of the world, because
that is an impossibility under Levinas’ philosophy, but instead can offer a richer view.
6

Levinas argues that this passivity of the non‐intentional cannot be explained by
potentiality, as some philosophers have tried, for it is an actual presence that is there without
having chosen to be there. He also argues that under a phenomenological analysis, this
presence that seems to be afraid of guiding us is as a mauvaise conscience. As a consequence
of this hidden non‐intentional consciousness the I will always have an incomplete picture of
the world where something is missed. This of course causes a big problem for Husserl’s
phenomenological analysis for it depends on human beings’ ability to fully know the world. On
the other hand, this non‐intentional consciousness plays a vital role in Levinas’ philosophy. It is
the origin of the humility of the I, where the I has to recognize that it is not possible for him to
fully grasp the world as he is not even able to totally know himself. The non‐intentional
consciousness does not allow the I to claim his identity, for it does not come to existence
because it is afraid of being. Non‐intentional consciousness is afraid of being because if it
comes to be, then it may be apprehended by the I’s intentionality, or even worse, become
intentional which might cause it to try to totalize the world according to its categories. As
Levinas says “this is either mauvaise conscience or timidity; it is not guilty, but accused; and
responsible for its very presence” (EFP 81). This non‐intentional consciousness will never take
control, or ever apprehend itself as an object of knowledge. It will always remain in its
passivity, reminding the I of his finitude and his limitations. Those limitations become more
obvious when the I faces the anguish of death, a territory that resists being discovered.
The passivity of non‐intentional consciousness denounces the mauvaise conscience
that leaves the I with a feeling of incompleteness that forces him to question himself. For
Levinas, this mauvaise conscience implies a position where the being is open to question, but
7

more importantly “also to questioning” (EFP 82). It is in this questioning that language, not
natural, but rather the mere possibility of, is born in responsibility. When the other questions
the I’s well–being, he must respond. The I must be responsible for his right to be. This
responsibility is not in some moral, ethical or other variety of code as modern society claims.
This responsibility is to the other, to a specific someone, a specific face whose presence in the
world the I may be affecting simply by making himself present in the world.
On Levinas’ philosophy the I fears the wars and the killing that may happen as a
consequence of his presence in the world. This fear prevents the I from taking his place in the
“Da of his Dassein; it is the inability to occupy a place, a profound utopia” (EFP 82). It is
important to notice that Levinas is not talking about the master‐slave1 fight that Hegel
proposes, nor of fear for the revenge of the other, but rather about the fear of causing damage
to this face, whose mortality is revealed to the I before it is revealed to him. As Levinas says
the mortality of the other summons the I, and thereby makes his death his worry and
responsibility. This responsibility for the Other comes before being; it exists in a time
immemorial. This responsibility goes “beyond what I may or may not have done to the Other,
or whatever acts I may or may not have committed” (EFP 83); as if the I was responsible for
the other’s death even before being. The I can see what is hidden to the other: his own death.
Through his expressions, the I can see the reality that the other will die; his mortality is more
apparent to him. The I is responsible to him even before he is responsible to himself, even
before the I becomes a being. This fear of the death of the other does not become a fear of his
own death, but rather it “extends beyond the ontology of the Heideggerian Dasein and the
bonne conscience of being in the sight of that being itself” (EFP 85). His responsibility for the
8

other does not refer to his unique features as a particular being; it is not about ontology but
about metaphysics. Thus the I’s accountability to the Other is ultimately vast. This
responsibility is born in the very Being of the other, for the I can see the death that lies hidden
in the face of the other.
It is in the encounter with the other that the I, a self‐consciousness individual, finds
what Levinas deems the ‘infinity’ that challenges and actually defeats his intention of totalizing
the world. It is within this encounter with a being that the I realizes his duty to protect the
other, within an “I am the unique, the chosen one” mindset. The I’s infinity remains hidden to
him and to everyone, yet in this encounter, the I’s fixation to erase the otherness of the world
stops. Levinas’ states “It is the laying down by the ego of its sovereignty (in its hateful
modality), that we found ethics and also probably the very spirituality of the soul, but most
certainly the question of the meaning of being, that is its appeal for justification” (EFP 85). It is
easy to infer that it is at the peak of his ego that the I recognizes how useless his inclination to
totalize the Other is. On the contrary, the I reconciles itself with its ethical duty to protect the
Other, in such a way that he is ready to have knowledge of the world without objectifying it.
The I is now able to match knowledge with Being.
1.2 Language
As we have seen, it is through language that the I builds his picture of the world. In
other words, it is how the I relates and directs his intentions to the world. Since these
intentions are affected by the face of the other, the ethical mandate that the other makes on
the I needs to be reflected in language. Given this importance, Levinas amplifies his critique of
Husserl’s intentionality as first philosophy based on what he considers failures in the

9

contemporary conception of language. Levinas argues that it is not viable for any natural
language to capture the mandate of the Other. In his encounters with the other the I tries to
totalize him. However, the I sees in the face of the other a call for justice that requires the
other to speak and let his voice be heard, for discourse is justice. This discourse is built on the
need that the other arouses in the I, a desire to know him, yet at the same time calls for
respect to his exteriority. The I only sees the other’s exteriority, for his subjectivity is hidden. In
fact, it is possible that he may deceive the I, but his desire to know him leads the I to take this
risk and engage in a discussion with him. It can be said that from this encounter, justice is
actualized as a discourse where we suspend action to theorize; we then have a theory “in
which truth arises” (TI 82).
It is important to keep this in mind because later in this essay, I will develop the idea
that it is possible to match the position of the other as equal to the I, for my idea of the other
is not necessarily those with economic need. Rather, the other is one who has been deposed
of his identity because he has been totalized by the I, but he is now ready to claim his place in
the world. He does this by questioning the I, so that they may engage in conversation where
the other compels the I to include words such a ajolote in the discourse.
It is important to notice that in this conversation with the other to find out the just way
to act does not involve only the I and the other, but also a third party, the other people that
are also part of the conversation. This conversation already implies the Other, with a capital O
to denote the metaphysical Other who represents not a particular being, or a particular other,
but the “faces of the poor, the stranger, the widow and the orphan” (TI 255) who have
suffered the abuse of the I. This Other makes his way to the conversation through what
10

Heidegger defined as the “house of Being”: language (LH 76). He is there even before time or
any natural language had been constructed.
In his encounter with a face the I sees the mastering of the Other, whose desires he
welcomes making this mastery unmistakable. The I comes to realize that “my freedom does
not have the last word; I am not alone in the world.” (TI 101) As a consequence of this
encounter, the I and the other communicate with each other with words that precede
language. Levinas attacks the notion that the pronouns I, we, us, etc, have a complete meaning
independent of an understanding of language. Notice that in this case Levinas is using
language not in the sense of a natural language such as French, English, Spanish, etc., but in
the same sense used by Heidegger where language, is taken as the medium to possess the
world. In other words, it is only through language that we can access the world and make it
ours.
However, Levinas modifies this notion by saying that the language, has been broken up
by the Other. In other words, the declaration of the title ‘the other’ reveals the existence of an
accusative case that is there before time. The face of the other testifies to the positivity of the
I’s being accosted by another human being, an event that holds ‘the secret of the birth
(naissance) of thought itself and of the verbal position by which it is conveyed” (CP 125). Allow
me to clarify this concept, before the I starts building a language, the Other is there in a place
before time, demanding him to build a language in such a way that the I takes him into
consideration, forcing the I to name things not based on the I’s needs or intentions, but on his
response to the Other’s questioning. This inapprehensible presence will always be there to
remind the I of the other. The Other cannot be named. He represents the il that cannot be
11

contained by any specific being in the world or by any natural language. Levinas argues that il
does not enter into any present time, that the names and verbs that it intends to represent are
no longer suited, but it refers to everything that cannot be totalized.
In his essay “Levinas and Language”, John Llewelyn presents us with the theory of
Structuralism, and the use that Levinas makes of it to create his notion of language. In this
notion the Other makes the I talk about a true humanism, in opposition to what Llewelyn calls
anti‐humanist theories where Signifiance is outside the human beings’ realm. Llewelyn
explains to us that for Saussure, one of the creators of structuralism, the signs that symbolize
the objects do not stand positively independent of the objects they represent, but in the
relation they have with other symbols. To clarify, meaning is to be found in written language,
not in the objects that symbols represent. According to Saussure, there are “…two
distinguishable but inseparable components: a phonetic, graphic or otherwise embodied
signifier (signifiant) and a signified concept (signifie)” (CCL 119). The signifiant is the meaning‐
giver in the communication process, and the signifie is the passive object/concept that waits to
be defined. Under this conception the being of an object is not in the object itself, but in the
word we use to talk about it, in the writing graphics where we can read “book” and establish
the relation to the object which in some sense is now in the word and not in the object itself.
Levinas will modify and use the concept of signifiant as a vital part of his justification of
Ethics as first philosophy. For Levinas, in contrast with Saussure who places the role of
signifiant in the letters of a name, the signifiant is the person who is saying the phrase; in
other words, the entity that is pointing out the object, and through this action giving meaning
to the concept. It is important to notice that this individual is not an impersonal I, or the first
12

person of the singular we, as in the “I” who use a language that is common to the community
of speakers of that language. Levinas underlines that saying is extremely personal because
through what he says he gives meaning to the world. It refers to the specific individual who is
writing the word. For example, when a Spanish speaking person writes campesino to refer to
the person who labors the land, and with it he does not only refers to what most Spanish
speaking people would understand as a farm worker but also to the implications that his
subjectivity carries on the word, he is the person that establishes the relationship between the
nine letters and the person in the world he is pointing out, not the code by itself. Levinas
argues that the code does not give sense outside of the person that is speaking, in other words
the code does not give meaning independently of the person doing the saying. He says that
the one who speaks is a face; a face where the active subjectivity of the speaker is revealed to
the world. However, this saying does belong entirely to the I who is speaking, for as we
pointed out before, the Other is already in language. He is there even before the I or the other
say a word.
As we have seen, under Structuralism, the words that are said carry the semantic
signification of the message, but under Levina’s argument it is the person doing the speaking
who attempts to give the meaning, but is limited by what has been already said. The saying of
a person is already the saying of his saying. The I cannot subtract himself from the relation
between signifiant and signifier, for he is the one establishing the relation between the object
pointed out and the code used to describe it. Levinas adds that the signifiant, the person doing
the speaking, directs his language towards the signifier‐ understood here not as an object as
Structuralism says, but towards the face of the Other. In other words, the saying of the I does
13

not describe objectively the world, but rather he should direct his saying through his
unavoidable subjectivity to satisfy the demands of the Other.
At this point a question can be made: How is it that the Other interferes in the being?
In order to answer this, we need to remember that even when Levinas separated himself from
Heidegger and his conception of Being still his theory has some roots in this concept. As I
explained before, for Heidegger, language is the way we possess and totalize the world.
According to him, it is in the Being where we can find the answer to the meaning of life.
However, for Levinas, language needs to reflect our responsibility for the Being. This
responsibility can be seen in the way language describes beings: the particular entities that
reflect, but are not the Being. We can see now how Levinas adopted this idea of language as
responsibility, but he says that this responsibility must be directed towards the other human,
not to an abstract Being. In “Levinas and Language” Llewellyn explains to us that for Heidegger
the Da‐sein, is to be understood as a presence in the world possessed by language (TB 87). The
only possible way to know this presence is through the dialogue with other people who share
the language. While for Heidegger this possession by language is a way of being with others,
Levinas would take this concept further and say that it is also possession by others. The call to
be responsible to the other and the Other is anterior to being responsible for the Being.
Levinas recognizes that there is a paradox in this responsibility “in that I am obligated without
this obligation having begun before me, as though an order slipped into my consciousness like
a thief, smuggled itself in, like an effect of one of Plato’s wandering causes” (OB 13). He solves
this by saying that since it is impossible for this to happen in consciousness, but still happens,
we can infer that we are not longer in the realm of consciousness. Therefore the I’s duty to the
14

other must have happened before he was conscious of himself. This argument is offered by
Levinas as a proof that this smuggling of the Other into his consciousness must have happened
before the I came to existence. The Other broke out into language, and set himself before the
I’s consciousness in such a way that when he speaks and gives meaning to the world, the other
is there to influence the I, to direct the I’s subjectivity to his face, inspiring him not to be
responsible to the Being, but to the face of the other.
John Llewelyn explains that “Signifiance as what I shall call ‘deep’ saying testifies to the
positivity of my being accosted by another human being, an event that holds the secret of the
birth (naissance) of thought itself and of the verbal proposition by which it is conveyed” (CCL
120). Language reflects the summons that the other makes to the I. Signifiance is then the
expression of the I’s neighbor; his saying is prior to any culture, to every history of language.
The face that summons the I only needs to show its appearance; it does not need a natural
language or a justification for its demands to the I. This appearance shows the history where
damage has been done to the Other—to the I’s neighbor, but the Other does not depend on
this history to validate its demands, for the demands of the Other come from a place before
time. This is to say that the I’s duty to the Other, does not depend on the present
circumstances or in what the I has done to the other, but on his ethical duty to any stranger
that asks for his help, for the I’s well being is a reflection of the abuses that the I has
committed to the other by the mere fact of his existence.
It is by placing responsibility before the dichotomy being‐language that Levinas nullifies
the possible justifications of the I using objectivity as an excuse to escape from the demands of
the Other. He wants me, the I, a person not a system, to give meaning to the world in response
15

to the Other. By assigning the responsibility of meaning giver to the I, Levinas prevents the I
from saying that the world works in a way that the I cannot control, therefore he does not
have responsibility for the Other. He emphasizes the idea that he is the I who establishes the
relation between his conceptions and the objects he wants to conceptualize. However, it is
very important not to forget that this saying is preceded by the face of Other. Levinas says that
the face of the Other is there before the saying that signifies the world, tying the I to the
responsibility to the Other. This responsibility for the other goes to a “psychosis, intending us
to hear in these resonances both of Husserl’s Beseelung, animation, and of madness or folly,
the topic taken up from Freud in the work of Foucault and Lacan” (CCL 124). Does this mean
that the I is not free to make this decision, the decision of protecting the other? No, in fact the
I can make the decision of breaking contact with the eyes of the other. He can choose to kill
the other. Even when he is consumed by his desire of knowing him, he can, at a big cost, resist
this impulse. The I by both a rational decision where he can see the need of the other, and his
own need of the other to build a better knowledge of the world, surrenders himself to his
ethical duty to the face of the other and gives up the idea of killing the other.
This responsibility to the face of the other does not stop in a passive feeling of
compassion or pity towards the face of the other, but becomes an active mandate that
compels the I to first lay down the hand he was holding a knife to kill the other with, and later
to place in this same hand his own breath to offer it to the other. The responsibility of the I to
the other does not finish with this action; it extends to the point where the I helps the other to
build his own dwellings in a way that the other can enjoy life again.
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Unfortunately, the situation where the I, the person with power, aids the other to
establish himself in a situation where the other has his needs satisfied is not common yet. It is
still the case when some people based on their power or customs think it is acceptable to
ignore the needs of other people or even take advantage of them. We can think in a person
who, through all his life, has been told that some people are inferior to him and that he has
the right to classify them according to his desires and intentions. A clear example of an I that
does not acknowledge his ethical duty to the other is in the Lomas del Poleo2 conflict where
the Pedro and Jorge Zaragoza brothers dispute the possession of a land situated two miles
from the border between United States and Mexico in the west side of Ciudad Juarez to 50
families that have lived there for more than 30 years.
Since Lomas del Poleo is the middle of the desert, this land was of no use or interest to
anybody but the people who live there. However, when the project of having a commercial
corridor that runs through this land became real this land called the attention of powerful
business man whom despite the opportunity they have to be fair and help Lomas del Poleo
inhabitants to improve their life, they instead pretend to use their power to force the residents
of this community to leave the land in dispute. Lomas del Poleo residents live in a community
with its inherent problems and conflicts, but some of these inhabitants became united as one
person when their homes and identities were threatened by the Jorge and Pedro Zaragoza
brothers whom claim to be the legal owners of the land. It is important to remember that the
Tribunal Federal Agrario (The Agrarian Federal Court) has not ruled in favor on any of the parts
involved in the conflict. It ordered for things to remain the same while the conflict was solved.
This is to say that the residents have the right to stay and live there as free citizens. However,
17

in a clear demonstration of power and disdain for the other the Zaragoza brothers ordered the
construction of a fence around the community kept by armed guards that control the access to
the community. By building a fence and not being present when the court requires both parts
in conflict to be present, the Zaragoza brothers deny the existence of the other.
Even though the Zaragoza brothers have a lot of relations with other members of the
business community, they do not want to start a dialogue with the other, the one that is
different to them and they seem to consider an object without an face, an other that should
not only be respected but also helped to reach a comfortable life‐style. They instead want to
totalize them by putting the residents of Lomas del Poleo under their categories, meaning
maquiladora workers with jobs that barely allows them to survive, and not dignity or
recognition of their identity as individual, self sufficient, ethical beings whatsoever.
It is clear to see that they are failing to live up to their personal duty to protecting the
other against a system, as well as any other circumstance that represents a danger to the
other based on the excuse that they are just following the dictates of a global economic
system. This of course goes against Levinas’ philosophy where the responsibility is personal
and directed to the face of the other, not to a system.

1.3 Saying and Said
Another way that Levinas uses to explain his concept of the other is through the
distinction between said and saying. Levinas argues that the pronoun I, in the phrase “I think”,
as well as other pronouns such as “she” and “them” may very well not be limited to the person
they wanted to point out at the beginning of the saying. These pronouns “do not designate
pure sensible receptivity, but engage the conceptualizing activity of the understanding, albeit
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not in the same ways as do common nouns” (CCL 128). When a person says “I”, pretty soon he
will realize that this implies the understanding of his own sentience. He cannot have a private
language that may allow him to give arbitrary meaning to the word. In other words, he needs
to participate with the language that was there before words were created. Levinas says that
there are concepts that cannot be written for they are written in the human soul and it is
better if we do not translate them to a written work for they express principles that are there
before the comprehension of any particular language.
These principles evoke the fraternity that captures all human beings through past and
future time. This fraternity does not refer only to the I’s encounter with the other, but with the
Other, with “the face of the poor, the stranger, the widow and the orphan, and at the same
time, of the master called to invest and justify my freedom” (TI 255). They command the I to
serve the other, based on the accusation that the Other makes to him. The impersonal Other
throws in the I’s face the comfort reached at the expense of had taken his place in the Da‐sein.
This displacement of the other is not the consequence of a specific action of the I, but just the
consequence of his being in the world. The I is to respond to this call that the face of the other
makes on him by questioning his well being. In Llewellyn’s words, “My being called by them is
my owning it to them not to require a demonstration of their right, not to require even that
philosophy produce a logical refutation of the conclusion of some anti‐humanist science that
responsibility is a laughable delusion”(CCL 132). This means that even when Levinas would
agree that reason, logic and all totalizing systems are needed to some extend they cannot
comprehend the infinity that is the being; they do not capture what is otherwise than being.
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To be clear, I say that for Levinas the saying is taken as pure signification. In
consequence the pure communication of the said can be understood to be prior to
communication and it is crucial to the inter‐subjective essence of being. The resounding of the
said includes things like poetry in truth claims, but even poems can be thematized. Levinas
wants to leave open the idea that there is this traumatic experience that is unpredictable.
While we are continuously assembling and disassembling things, as well as creating theories of
language, and so forth, he is trying to get us to accept the phenomenon of exile3 and the
ambiguity of certainty as a possible reality.
1.4 The Face
The face of the other is revealed to us as an epiphany that is different to sensible
experience. The information that our senses gives to us does not complete the concept of
sensation. Levinas argues that the psychological theories that advocate for sensation being just
a mental process, which can happen in introspection independent of the object that caused
the sensation, have already lost the physical character of the sensation. Even when sensations
need the object they are referring to, they are not reducible. A question can be asked here: if
sensations are not in the object or in the physical senses: where are they? They are in the
relation between the I and the non‐I, where sensible life is “lived as enjoyment” (TI 187).This
dynamic relation escapes a mere objectification of the entities observed for the enjoyment of
life is there before the instantiation of an I and a non‐I, before the establishment of a
relationship between subject and object. Levinas explains that “the specificity of each
sensation is reduced precisely to that quality without support or extension” (TI 188). This lack
of content testifies that sensations cannot be reduced to the mere data of the physical
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qualities of the object observed. Rather these sensations are complemented by the
phenomenology of sensation as enjoyment, as a transcendental function of our senses. This
means that beyond the physical senses as sight and touch that identifies the identical with
itself, sensations are to be interpreted not only in the pure objective aesthetic and sensorial
value that the object has, but in the enjoyment the I, as the observer, finds in the contact with
an object. In other words, an object or situation is not only valuable only for its obedience to
the mathematical relations or the right proportions it may have; it is also valuable because the
joy the I finds on his relationship with it; a joy that goes beyond the physical perception of the
object.

Even when sensations are discovered by all our senses, vision has a privileged position
in the disclosure of the world. Vision presupposes the light; a light that is necessary to
establish the relation with the object. In other words, objects come from nothingness; this
origin allows them to resist the attempt of being totalized. However, when they are brought
into the light we can start a relation with them. For example, when the Zapatista rebellion
came to the light in the southern state of Chiapas in Mexico the first day of 1994 mass media
showed to the rest of the world the existence of indigenous communities that live under
extreme poverty and discrimination. By making themselves present in the world and attracting
the light to them, they came out of the larga noche de los quinientos anos ( FS 77 ) awaking
people’s desire to know them and their problems at the same time that Zapatistas offered an
alternative perspective of reality. Light invites us to touch the objects, “by the hand the object
is in the end comprehended, touched, taken, borne and referred to other objects, clothed with
a signification, by reference to other objects” (TI 191).However, we should notice that light
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only establishes the conditions for the face to face relation, it is not signifiance by itself. We
should not forget that light does not go beyond what already is: the sameness of the object
with itself, there is an interiority that gives identity to an object. Levinas’ conception does not
deny this; he only adds that this interiority, in other words this sameness of the objects with
themselves, gives them a total identity for this interiority has to be contrasted with their
exteriority, which is the perception that other people may have of the object.
Even in darkness where light cannot reveal the objects, there is a void which is not
equivalent to nothingness. This void gives us the sense of the impersonal there is, the
existence of something that does not need a specific being to come to life. This causes a
vertigo that comes from a mythical facelessness. However, light brings the beings that are
covered by darkness to our view where we can name them and with that give meaning to
them. We separate the objects through language not light, but the darkness or the never
ending conversation that remains in them prevents us from totalizing them. In addition to
that, the there is does not allow people to have a full perception of the object. As it is easy to
see now, two elements, the exteriority and the there is, prevent us from totalizing an object. It
is important to notice that this lighting of the objects that allow us to distinguish them gives us
enjoyment for by having a relation with the objects we name, we move from a mere
objectification of the objects to the affective content.

This effort to totalize an object is even more futile when it comes to an attempt to
totalize a face. The difference of the Other does not come from physical differences for that
would imply our common membership to genus and that would nullify alterity. The face of the
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Other resists to be apprehended. In Levinas words, “The face of the Other breaks with the
world we have in common” (TI 194). This happen because its appearance breaks with my
continuity, with the regularity of the world. Its appearance makes infinitude present to me.
This infinity that breaks with logic is possible only in language, where both me and the other
keep our identities but cannot comprehend the other. Logic cannot fully operate here for as
we know logic requires complete definitions in order to be applicable to the world, but in
Levinas’ philosophy we never archive a final concept, they are always changing according to
the presence of other people whom join the conversation and the interiority of people and
objects that prevents the I to ever have full knowledge of the world.
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Chapter II: Diversity
2.1 Diversity as a Value
Opposite to totalitarian ethical systems, Levinas’ philosophy asks for diversity in order
to have a better perception of reality. His concept of infinity offers an open room for people
who want to challenge the idea that a total conceptualization of human beings is possible.
Humanists, phenomenological philosophers, artists, etc, say that there is no social, economic,
or physiological theory that could contain all the possibilities of expressions that a human
being is capable of. They claim that there is more to reality than just a naturalistic conception
of the physical world; human experiences or the way humans experience is transcends the
realm of natural world. It is important to note that I am making a distinction between the
natural world, which includes the physical world and its laws, and reality, which for the
purpose of this text; I will define as the way human beings experience the natural world. I will
accept this difference based on the phenomenological position that claims that the world is
experienced by someone whose subjectivity is unavoidable. Of course, this experience must be
grounded in the natural world, but I would claim that the way we form our knowledge of
reality is unavoidable affected by the way persons perceives the world; it is then about how a
person perceives the world rather than about how it actually is. I conclude then that even
when we have a direct access to the world it is subject to interpretation. Thus we act in the
realm of reality not in the natural world. Reality, thus, can be altered insofar as the limits that
the natural world imposes on us. Once this has been established, it can be inferred that the
range of experiences is as diverse as the world’s population and that this diversity must be
recognized in order to build an accurate representation of the world. As I will show later, this
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does not mean that we will accept all of them; there are criteria to justify which perceptions
should be accepted into our belief system. We can safely ignore the demand of taking all ideas
into our belief systems because the problem of cultural relativism has been largely discussed
and the conclusion has been set: cultural relativism leads to contradictions; therefore it must
be avoided4.
The possibility of having wrong interpretations of the world implies the existence of a
world as it is, which we want to describe under one language, a common ground where ideas
are brought to trial and are condemned to be forgotten or to become a vital part of the world
as we conceive it. The existence of this common language is an ideal long time pursuit for
investigators of all fields. The description of reality in terms of a language system based needs
to “go along with innumerable differences” (UD 552); differences that represent the voice of
the other whom has been ignored in the I’s representation of the Being. These differences
come when we ask how, not what happens. The answers to the how‐questions come with
different levels of knowledge‐as the physical, the organic, and the social that must be
reconciled in order to accommodate the novelty that comes form the viewers’ experience or
sensations to put it in Levinas’ terms. In this way we will achieve our goal of reconciling unity
with diversity. A diversity that is necessary for a person to enjoy life through a well‐rounded
life.
To promote this idea that diversity is a vital component of a well‐rounded life, I will
analyze the significance of omitting the progress that a standardized, totalizing society offers.
Although this kind of society offers a faster way to reach economic goals, economic
improvement cannot fulfill human nature alone. It is known that, unfortunately, not all people
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benefit from economic development. However, for the sake of clarity, allow me to ignore this
fact in my argument, which is that by ignoring alternative voices in favor of efficiency,
totalizing societies lose the critiques and contributions of people who are not submerged in
the system. With that they lose the opportunity to better the living conditions of the
community by allowing persons to have a more complete knowledge of the Being through the
recognition and inclusion of the voice of the other. These conditions contain, but are not
limited to economic conditions. This also includes other dimensions that make life more
affluent such as art, music, self expression, dignity, etc. It is clear that for a society to reach
these goals it must be inclusive, but not to the point where we accept all beliefs as equal.
It is patent that we do not want to give true value to ungrounded opinions because we
do not want arbitrariness in our belief system. Every perspective that becomes part of our
belief system must be tested against reality and the natural world. We need to take a position
that disregards false beliefs because they can take us to make wrongs decisions. These include
those that are not subject to trial, and have no predictive power or desirable effect in the
world. These desirable effects refer to the strength of ethical relationships within human
beings and our environment as well as the emergence of aesthetic experiences5.
It is important to observe that it is not advantageous to tolerate positions that claim to
have a special access to reality; an access that cannot be proved right or wrong by what some
exclusive groups call outsiders. I sustain that the inclusion of different ideas does not imply
open admission because there are some of which that, upon being intolerant or contrary to
reality, undermine the whole purpose of diversity which is to make life better‐rounded
through the unique experiences that diversity can create. They meet neither the ethical nor
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the descriptive criteria to be included into our belief system. In other words, for an idea to be
useful in our belief system it must offer either an accurate description or an ethical effect of/in
the world. Otherwise, it is just an empty set or an argument that cannot be tested in its
soundness. This is not to say that an idea that at the present moment does not have a
correspondence with reality should be rejected automatically. We need to take into
consideration that some ideas take longer to be instantiated. However, in all cases the aim is
that they are to be judged within the tribunals of both reality and the natural world.
There are some positions that claim that reality is not a safe port where we can find
certainty. Skepticism, for example, claims that since we have limited cognitive capacities we
can never be sure that our knowledge of the world is correct. The other one is extreme
phenomenology, which claims that intentionality is the ultimate meaning‐giver. This stance
holds that even when the universe behaves according to its inner rules; it is only until an
observer apprehends the world through language that its being comes into existence. Thus,
since the world resides in language which is ultimately shaped by the speaker, he in turn can
modify the world according to his desires.
Husserl says that since we, as human beings, have a superior access to the world we
can give arbitrary interpretations to it. As established early in the essay, Levinas cautions us
against this phenomenological tradition that pretend to make intentionality the ultimate tool
we use to create our picture of the world and want this interpretation to be taken as truth.
Allow me to refute both ideas. To answer the first one, we can safely agree that there is a
natural limitation to the way we human beings acquire knowledge of the world, but that is not
to say that we have no epistemological access to it at all. In fact, even when our brain has
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limited capabilities, we are able, through science, reason, experience, and intuition of having
an accurate picture of the world.6The fact that our best scientific theories have a high
predictive power is enough proof that there is a physical world that follows rules to which we
all have to surrender. To answer the second, we can agree with them that we cannot escape
ourselves and have a fully objective view of the world; we interpret the world according to our
subjectivity. In this process of apprehension of reality we give new elements to it; however
these new elements such as ideologies, perspectives, culture, etc, are contained by the realm
of nature. It is not possible to say that my interpretation of the world is truthful based only in
my own certainty of that idea because if we accept this as a valid argument we will live in a sea
of indeterminacy. In other words, even there is subjectivity and we cannot escape from it that
is not to say that we must give all subjective opinions the same value.
It is important to notice, however, that as the phenomenological position claims the
world also has the component of a viewer, who has a unique perspective on it. Through this
perspective he enriches and modifies reality. The world is not just out there, but it is
experienced by someone. Robert Sokolowsky points out that in phenomenology the world is
experienced by a person who is “not isolated in a bubble… but has a conscious relation with
the world” (IP 8). This relationship evolves to interpretations of it and they demand a place in
the conceptualization of reality. If somebody’s experience, qua experience, has a factual
existence in the world, this implies that there are as many experiences as human beings. As a
consequence, we need to take all of them into consideration; otherwise we would be facing an
ever incomplete picture of reality. At first, having a world with countless positions does not
seem like a desirable world to live in. However, as I will try to prove, it is better to be open to
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new ideas, which we can disregard after we analyze them, than to reject ideas a priori based
on an extreme naturalistic position.
In a naturalistic position in order to have a stable conception of the world, we ignore
perspectives that cannot be mapped out to the physical world as it is now. In the position that
I promote, we open our scope in a way that we include not only what it is now but also what
could be. Of course, since there is only one natural world, all realities, meaning all the
propositions of what could be, must fit in it. This is to say that since we have not explored all
the possibilities that are contained in the natural world we should be open to the questioning
that alternative positions suggest to us. It is clear that ignoring ideas that do not fit into our
current conception of the natural world is not the best option. The reason being that the
conception of the natural world we have now is also a human experience; it belongs first to
the realm of reality and later to the natural world.
It can be argued that we are limited to the possibilities contained in the natural world.
Nothing is easier to agree on. However, since we do not have full knowledge of nature, we
need to stay in the realm of reality and push it to the limits that nature has imposed on us. In
other words, we can accept revolutionary and rebel ideas and then test them against the
effects they have first in reality and later in the natural world. If they survive this test they
should be admitted on our belief system. My advice then is that in order to have an accurate
representation of the world, we need to take in consideration the different experiences,
evaluate them, and, if they survive, incorporate them to our conception of reality.
It is important to remember that the survival of an idea is not limited to his descriptive
power because it can mutate to another form that makes it desirable for us. One of these
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forms is traditional beliefs. By traditional beliefs, I mean the way of life that some people have
received from their ancestors, where they believed that some rituals would help them to
control nature. With the advance of science, it has become vey clear that such rituals do not
have the power that ancient people thought. However, I would argue that they, since they
have an actual effect in the world and are needed for us to fully understand it, should remain
in our belief system. I will offer two reasons for this. First, as Faber Marvin7 says since culture
is part of the physical world we need to treat it with the same consideration that we pay to
natural phenomena. Experiences as experiences, already exist in the world; all what we need
to do is to recognize this existence. Since they are already in the world, at this moment I am
willing to convey that they may be false beliefs, they still are there so we need to study them
in the same way that we study some failed scientific and philosophical theories that have
helped us to build our best philosophy. We need to learn what about in them is desirable and
what is not in our belief system. In this process we may learn that different visions of life still
have some validity under different criteria. This take us to my second reason, even when they
may not be an accurate description about how the world actually works, they also have worth
as cultural and ethical expressions that manifest their significance by becoming present in the
world. This presence may not be its original purpose, but still plays a vital role in making reality
meaningful. In other words, even when they have no direct predictive power and they do not
meet the first criteria; we should accept them as valuable cultural and ethical expression. We
need to recognize that they deserve to be protected because they contribute to enrich the
human experience.
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Under this concept, an idea should be judged not only by its immediate effects in the
world, but also in the secondary ones. These effects include the strength on the ethical
relationships that a ritual causes in a community. When people get together to perform a
ritual they create ties between them and their environment which has an actual effect in the
world. This effect may not be the one they wanted in the immediacy but still is very important
for its ethical and cultural consequences. These ethical consequences refer to how people’s
understanding of their relationship with the environment and other members of the
community grows as they get in direct relation with it. We can see this phenomenon in
indigenous communities that perform this kind of rituals. They have a healthier relation with
the Earth and the other members of the community which creates a non‐exploiting relation
with the other, with the weak person. In addition to this, there is the aesthetic value that
dances, rituals, prayers, etc. have. Allow me to introduce an example to make the concept
clearer. Consider the indigenous Zuni tribe where a dance to cause rain is still performed even
when thanks to the knowledge that we and they have now, it is clear for a rational person that
it is not going to happen. However, they still they do it as part of their life‐style; a life‐style that
promotes beauty and intuition as valid forms of knowledge at the same time that it strengths
the ethical relationships between them.
There is the argument that false beliefs, in the form of traditions, arouse more
problems than benefits, and that this is one of the cases where good will actually results in
bringing more damage than good to the people. Nevertheless, if people would solely accept
them as traditions rather than a means to secure or manipulate nature there is no detriment.
It is important to emphasize that I am advocating the idea that rituals should not be essential
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factors in the decision making process, but only as a part of what makes life interesting and
colorful while adding value to human experience. As established before, these traditions have
value so far as they are understood and exercised as traditions that modify reality, not as
accurate descriptions of how the natural world works. In other words, we know that the world
was not created by the Mayan Gods8, yet undeniably there was and to some number, still are
some people that believe it was. People as such should be prevented from taking traditional
beliefs out of their scope which in turn can lead to horribly bad decisions, such as suicide or
despair because of the belief that the world will come to an end after the Fifth Sun Cycle come
December 2012.
There is a great difference between beliefs as self‐deception and those that hold that
keeping tradition alive is a form of cultural identity. Self‐deception stems from one’s irrational
fixation in maintaining that his system of beliefs is absolute. One who is self‐deceived prefers
to stay in a state of ignorance or denial. An example can be found in the distinction between
using traditional cures for minor illnesses such as the flu as an alternative to standard
medication, and the refusal to receive specialized medical attention to major illnesses simply
because archaic ideas advise so. Beliefs should obviously not take precedence over one’s
physiological well‐being. On the other hand, a person who knows the rituals he performs has
no direct relation with the physical world but performs them for the ethical relationship with
others involved, is causing no personal damage or any to others for that matter.
2.2 Unity and Diversity
There is still a problem to solve: how can we reconcile a pluralistic view of the world
where different experiences are counted as inherent in it, and the unity that is necessary to
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explain the common universe we all inhabit? As established before, a good resolution is not
limiting the definition of the world to just “as is”, but including the very persons experiencing
it. Some people with a naturalistic perspective say that there should be a unified vision of the
world where objectivity plays a vital role in coalescing it in one unique picture, where all right
perspectives must concur. However, this monistic and extreme ideal of a complete reality is
unattainable because it ignores experience which, according to Marvin Farber, in agreement
with Levinas,“… must be taken seriously; [because] it is a changing process involving a
changing reality which is open forever” (UD 547). This experience and the person that is
experiencing the world cannot be taken out of the picture of the world, because his
experience is part of the physical world that he breaks into with his very participation in it.
The defenders of a unified universe say that the world exists as one unity, that the
explanation of the world must be directed towards the way the world is. The obvious problem
with that view is that having a single level unified universe implies the co‐existence of opposite
and contradictory phenomena. A holistic vision of this kind does not account for, say, the
principle of avoiding unnecessary pain and the fact that it still occurs. This position makes no
difference between ethical principles which exist in the realm of reality and the physical world.
If this position were true we would have a naturalized ethic,9 which for the most part we do
not. However, there is a distinction between ethical principles and natural laws. The problem
here would reside in the belief held by people who cause unnecessary pain. This belief that
caused such a faulty action, then, is obviously wrong and must be eliminated because it goes
against both the ethical principle of protecting the other and the equilibrium in nature of
killing only to the extend necessary to survive.
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In order to explain this problem, we must allow room for diversity. We need to accept
that this world is experienced in various ways by people of various cultures, and that these
differing experiences all contribute to the knowledge of the very nature of the world. This
vision challenges the idea of a closed system compared to the ones proclaimed by Spinoza,
Hegel and others. Farber says that “the Eleatic school could prove that reality is necessarily
one, while apparently sacrificing the facts of experience” (UD 543). Under a naturalistic
position all the facts in the world, present and future, must be contained in the system. This
leaves no room for elements other that the ones already present in the physical world.
However, as we can see, this is not the case. Rather, new elements emerge and modify it.
These new elements are the experiences that every human being brings to the world. Allow
me to elaborate. Since these elements must be contained by the system itself, and low
capacity consciousness as in lower animals may not have the capacity to modify the world
beyond their minor capacities, the best alternative for changes in the world is a superior
mental capacity as the ones human have. This level of consciousness gives experience a
material validity. This is not to say with Husserl that consciousness is the ultimate meaning
giver, but that neither are totally physical entities as trees or chickens.
Marvin Farber argues that there is a middle ground between monistic realism and
plural universes. He says that the way we use language gives us the idea of one universe.
When we say world, we declare the existence of one substance, but according to him this “one
substance leaves open the possibility that some regions of the universe are irrelevant to others
in a practical sense. It may also be maintained along with epistemological dualism which
recognizes the difference between the ‘content’ of the knowing mind and the object known”
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(UD 549). If we pay attention only to the first sentence, in which Farber proposes the existence
of different levels of reality, we face a scenario that is rather unsettling. The first problem is
that if there are realities that are irrelevant to each other, and one of these realities is
experience, then experiences would not necessarily be consistent with the world. One of the
consequences of this approach is that if that is the case then we would be living under a totally
subjective universe, without a common world to contrast the different interpretations of the
world. Or, we would be living in a physical universe where experience is not relevant. This of
course is a scenario that does not solve the original problem of counting experiences as a vital
part of the physical world. It only places experience in another frame of reference and leaves
the unity of the physical reality untouched. Nevertheless, the second part suggests a solution
to the problem.
Before we move on, it is important to assert that the difference between the object
known and the knower is philosophical, not scientific. In other words, the process of physical
perception is not being denied. It is well admitted that all forms of knowledge come from the
physical world including its social‐ historical aspects. As Farber says “one should never lose
sight of it, whatever in formal thought or in phenomenology, where forms are treated as
disengaged from their natural setting for purposes of analysis” (UD 550). This is to say that the
source of knowledge is sensorial experience, and that then the logic‐systematic analysis of the
phenomena experimented is done. The structures we have given and continue to give to the
world all originate within human thought. Some of these organizational means have failed, and
others have succeeded. Some of them have survived in the original form and for the original
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purpose they were created for. And still others, such as traditions, have evolved to a more
useful form, where they serve a different purpose than originally created for.
These structures that we have given to the world present different degrees of
possibility. In other words, it may be the case that these structure‐explanations are wrong.
From the point of view of formal possibility these structures can be ideally treated as a “set of
variables, one set of the possible values of which is the world itself” (UD 551). I would claim
that the main reason to support the position that there is not a complete logical relation
between the world and the way we perceive it is that the future cannot be foreseen. I say this
because we know the natural world as it is now, and we know the logic relations between
them. Seemingly we should then be able to fully predict people’s behavior, but we are not. I
agree that we can, to some degree, predict nature’s behavior, but there is another segment
that remains hidden to us. Naturalistic philosophers would argue that we cannot fully predict
nature yet because we lack the proper knowledge to do so. In principle, they argue, when we
are able to obtain this knowledge we will then be able to control nature to a higher degree.
Even when Levinas says that we cannot ever get full knowledge of the world, I am willing to
concede this point for it is not of interest to my argument to fight for the ultimate knowledge
of the physical world, as far as human experiences are not fully considered part of the physical
world. This is to say that does not matter how much we advance in physiological theories, we
will never be able to fully predict human behavior because human beings resist to be totalized;
there is something, the non‐intentional consciousness in Levinas’ words, that is never revealed
to the world. My claim is that there is a common world but it is subject to change by the way
we perceive it and act in consequence. If we perceive the world not as a finished reality, but as
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one that is subject to the modifications that our experiences tell us that are possible, then
through our acts we will modify it according to our unique visions. By doing this, the world is
then closer to the subjective model we make of it.
This is not to say that we can give arbitrary interpretations to the world, and expect the
world to be as we wish. We cannot just consider the world to be a fair place and think that just
by virtue of our intentions and perceptions this is the case. We need to test our intentionality
by acting in the world in an attempt to shape it according to them. It is important to recognize
that some of these changes may not be possible. In fact, that is why we need to take them to
the tribunal of nature to see if they do not break the limits of nature. One of these limits is the
non‐contradiction rule. I agree that every description as the one we want to give to the world
obeys at least to this basic rule. If a contradiction10 is given in the structure, this is enough
proof that something is wrong in the system.
I will attack the position where some dialectical philosophers argue that the law of non‐
contradiction applies only to formal systems, as logic, but not to reality. They say that
contradictions happen in real life and that they are indeed the driving force of reality. This
argument can be easily override by the distinction between a conflict among two opposed but
no contradictory poles, and the logic and natural impossibility of something being and not
being at the same time. Saying that there is tension between wealthy and poor people does
not represent a contradiction. It is possible for this tension to exist without breaking the rule.
What is not possible to say is that poor people are at the same time no poor people as in
wealthy people. That is something that just cannot exist. Poor and wealthy people can, and in
fact exist at the same time, without this being a contradiction. Presenting this conflict as such
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is a matter of how the statement is made, not about the world itself. In other words, if the
discourse to explain the world is done in the wrong way, contradictions may appear, but the
world cannot be and not be at the same time.
This example proves that taking the position of including experiences and perspectives
to accurately describe the world is not to say that the perspective of a viewer can be
automatically accepted as truth container. It is possible that a person makes mistakes in the
way he describes the world such as presenting the world as ideal systems where
contradictions exist. In this case his position must be counted as wrong, and be disregard or
used with caution. However, it is important to notice that these mistakes do not work against
the phenomenologist perspective of taking a person’s intentionality into our account of the
world. We need to remember that also science, recognized as the most objective vision of the
world11, also depends on the person who is doing the research who can also make mistakes.
Even science relies on the personal perspectives, intentions and background of the scientist.
The mistakes that the person may make are to be corrected by the performance of his
description and the community that is interested in these results. This principle applies to both
the phenomenological and the naturalistic view of the real world. If a scientific claim does not
match the real world, it is likely that it will not survive for a long time in our system of beliefs.
It is the same case in the phenomenological position where some beliefs that have no use the
will be ignored pretty soon.

What about getting the discourse as close as possible to the natural world? This is the
point that I am trying to make; an accurate picture of the world should include the experiences
of the people that are experiencing it. These experiences are to be translated into the world.
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This acting in the world would give more importance to experiences that the one that realistic
people want to give to it. If a person believes that the world can be otherwise and act
according to this belief, he will be having a physical effect in the world, modifying in this way
the physical world. This acting in the world gives experiences an additional value to the one
they have already by virtue of its existence; a value that makes life worth‐living.
2.3 Diversity and Morality
Through this essay I have presented Levinas’ idea of Ethics as first philosophy. This is to
say that an accurate construction of reality must take in consideration the voice of the other in
order to have a better and richer representation of the world. As I hope I have proved,
diversity is the logical consequence of the acceptance of alternative voices in the conception of
human reality. This consequence is not only necessary but also desirable, for listening to other
voices enhances the life of a person in a way he might have not realized before. An example to
prove my point is language. If we concord that language is the way a culture has
conceptualized the world, the most languages a person understands the better picture he has
of the world. In fact by increasing his knowledge of language a person also increases his
opportunity to survive as well as his capacity to incorporate the voice of the other in a more
diverse ethical discourse.
This call for diversity allows the I to instantiate his ethical duty to the other not
according to an established moral code, but to the agreement that the I, the other and the
third party can reach with the mutual benefit of having a life plethoric in perspectives. In order
to understand my claim that it not necessary or desirable to have a stable and unique moral
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code where the I can instantiate his ethical duty to the other, we should briefly discuss Owen
Flanagan’s paper “Admirable Immorality and Admirable Imperfection.” On this paper, he says
that “we have been addressing such problems without the concept of morality itself being of
much service, despite the ubiquity of the word moral”? (AIAI 59) In other words, we have been
using the word moral to talk about the consensus that some pre ‐enlightenment society
reached, but that does mean anything about the nature of morality. Flanagan takes this point
even further by affirming that the content to this consensus does not imply that we have any
knowledge about the nature of the morality, for it may “have no nature.” (AIAI 55)It is
important to stress the idea that morality may have not a fixed nature, however, the idea of
morality has a clear origin: the I’s duty to the other.
Some people may argue that even if morality comes from a consensus and that is all
what we have to determinate our morality then we should stick to it. However, beyond the
obvious flatness of the argument for the goal of moral philosophy is to find moral rules that
are applicable to all societies and times, there is another argument against that position: such
consensus is not reachable anymore. The point tat I am trying to prove is that moral codes
have traditionally come from an agreement between the members of certain society, but as
more cultures come in contact with others this agreement

has become harder if not

impossible to reach. As Flanagan states this “consensus is not reachable even within modern
moral theories” (AIAI 58), not to say in ordinary situations. All what modern moral theories‐
utilitarian, Kantian, contractarian, or virtue theoretical‐ have done is to find solutions to
specific situations within a stable, real life framework. However, according to Flanagan’s
argument when the framework is not so stable these moral theories are of a little use. To
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summarize Flanagan’s argument, the nature of morality can not be revealed by moral
philosophy, for there is not nature to be revealed.
It is important to clarify that this is not a call to moral anarchy, rather it is a position
where the definition of morality is built by all the people involved in the situation. We can
agree with Susan Wolf that an attack to a fixed morality is not “to say that moral values should
not be an important, even the most important, kind of value we attend to in evaluating and
improving ourselves and the world. It is to say that our values cannot be fully comprehended
on the model of a hierarchical system with morality at the top.” (MS 438)If we are to talk
about moral values, then we need to have a moral theory. Of course this moral theory may not
comprehend all possible situations. It needs to establish a dialogue with other values such as
the need for self perfection in order to be help people to fulfill our human nature.
I would argue that some sectors of contemporary society already recognize that artistic
and aesthetic considerations are values too. There are a good number of communities where
art and cultural expressions are as valuable as material help. Zapatistas, anarchist
communities, public universities, free or low price museums are just some examples that we,
as a society, also value art as a good. Once we accept this principle, we can also accept that
people who spend their time reading Victorian novel, playing the oboe or improving his
backhand in fact meet the definition of what a desirable behavior is. Then we can safely infer
that there is not tension between playing the piano and saving people form starving. They are
both valuable necessary acts.
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As we have seen Morality, Ethics and diversity are concepts that are closely tied in the
structure of a well‐rounded life. During the first part of this essay using Levinas’ philosophy I
have showed the ethical duty of the I, now is time to show what the other can offer to reality.
In order to archive this goal allow me to turn to Antonio Caso’s philosophy.
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Chapter III: Antonio Caso as the Voice of the Other
3.1 Antonio Caso: Against Totalization
In this chapter I will analyze the theory of the Mexican philosopher Antonio Caso12
regarding the presence of the Other, as defined in Levinas’ philosophy. This concept embraces
the importance of diversity in order to get a better picture of the world. Although these two
philosophers belonged to different generations,

13

they both contributed to elaborations on

Husserl’s phenomenology. As we know, Levinas rejected the predominance of intentionality in
Husserl’s philosophy while Caso embraced it as means to justify his rejection of logic and
reason as the only truth‐givers in our system of beliefs. However, it could be argued that given
more time, Caso would also have rejected this idea of the supremacy of intentionality on the
same basis Levinas did: the risk of totalization and categorization. I say this based on that both
Caso and Levinas thought that a person is irreducible to a set of categories given by a system
or a person. As I will show later, Caso said that human beings have infinite possibilities of
expressions and these experiences must be treasured in their respective worth.
Caso14 and fellow Mexican philosopher Samuel Ramos15 depict key illustrations of the
voice of the Other, a person who stops being a mauvaise conscience to become an active
presence in the world. They prove that, as John Wild points out in his introduction to Totality
and Infinity, “The other is not an object that must be interpreted and illuminated by an alien
light. He shines forth with his own light, and speaks for himself” (TI 14). Caso and Ramos
wanted Mexicans to shine on their own, so as not to become a mere reflection of what other
people such as the cientificos16, or more powerful countries, wanted Mexicans to be. They
fought for the Mexican voice to be stronger by self‐recognition first and later from recognition
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of the I which entails the unique characteristics that Mexicans live in. This recognition offers
Mexicans a sense of pride in the acknowledgement of the richness of their culture. Caso
challenged Mexicans intellectuals and people to face the I which was represented by the
totalizing position that cientificos and economic empires of that time had held in Mexico for
several decades. Caso also encouraged that proper respect be given to Mexican plurality as a
valid and admirable form of life. Both Caso and Ramos wanted Mexicans to question the
status‐quo wherein internal and external entities had kept a good percentage of them in the
shadows of ignorance and poverty. They proclaimed that the ideas of positivism and the
dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz had Mexicans living in conditions not only of material poverty but
also devoid of identity. Within their lifetimes, Caso and Ramos fixed this situation in two ways.
First, they strengthened the Mexican identity through a reconciliation of Mexicans with their
uniqueness. Second, they advocated and achieved a more active participation of Mexico in the
world, as opposed to the only holding perceptions of a false nationalism that would have kept
Mexico isolated from the world. Both were achieved through the acknowledgement of the
value of Mexican diversity and the complex formation of personhood. Even though they had
some differences in the level of divergence that they accepted in their philosophies, the
diversity and complexity of the Mexican identity was embraced by both of them. As Levinas
and Marvin, Caso claims that taking varied experiences into consideration forms a richer and
better but never full representation of the world.
In agreement with Levinas, Antonio Caso claims that a person is not a thing that can be
fully understood. A human being cannot be cut in parts where he can be analyzed by sciences
because he belongs to the higher hierarchical level of beings. Caso says that a “person does
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not belong only to the physical world, but to the realm of organic nature” (HPTS 43). Our
bodies obey the rules of nature, but our intellect and consciousness separate us from other
living organisms. Our intellectual abilities make us persons, not just individuals that respond to
the needs of nature. In other words, as established by Levinas, there are dimensions such as
human sensations‐experiences that transcend the limits of the natural world in the sense that
they do not only disobey the natural world but in fact they become a causal force that
modifies it. We are social beings who require more than just food and reproduction. Surviving
is not enough to satisfy our desires; we need to have a well‐rounded life, and this necessitates
a society where we can instantiate and test our perception of reality. This encounter is made
in a context of mutual need for the other, a dependence that is embraced by both Caso and
Levinas.
This social function cannot be completed in a system in which the individual works for,
but rather quite the opposite. Antonio Caso points out that the fulfillment of the social
function is denied for both communism and individualistic capitalistic societies, as they ignore
the quality and uniqueness of every human being. We cannot be subordinated to any system,
no matter how well intended that system is, because that requires setting limits to the infinite
possibilities of a person’s self‐realization. This does not entail that a person live in a
directionless17 freedom whereupon everything is subject to the individual’s intentionality as
individualism proposes. Similarly, it does not call for a person to live within a system in which
everything is given and there is no room for innovation or personal input. A person needs a
society where he can express his personality, and society needs persons, not individuals, to
exist. This ideal society is “based on justice that is the moral union of men who respect value”
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(HPTS 47), because humans are creators of values 18 This is to say that society is formed by the
ethical encounter of different persons in justice, not by a system imposed on them by other
foreign agents.
From that position it can be inferred that, as both Levinas and Caso claim, life is to be
enjoyed through the ethical encounter with the other free of interferences from totalizing
systems. In Caso’s words, “The spirit flourishes above life, in the same way that life flourishes
above physical nature” (HBTS 44). This strength comes from the overflow that we humans
have because our condition makes us superior to animals. This distinction allows humans to
enjoy social elements of life and not live solely to satisfy our physical needs. Since fixed
structures impede the individual’s self realization, both Levinas and Caso resist the idea of
systematization. Just as Levinas promoted a philosophy against anti‐Semitism and any other
form of disregard for the other because he believed it was an ethical duty to protect those in
need, Caso’s mission was to exile Comte’s positivism from early twentieth century Mexico
because he thought that the social and economic consequences that this system had created
was oppressing people by creating a faceless population who had no voice or identity. Caso
devoted much of his philosophical work proving that intuition should also be included in
Mexican philosophy alongside logic, as it takes the Mexican individuality into account. John H.
Haddox19 points out that Caso wanted to create a philosophy that “expresses the aspirations
and ideals as well as the reality of Mexico” (PMP 581). Caso believed that Mexicans, as well as
all people, must listen to the history that has shaped cultures and peoples. Furthermore, they
should resist the idea of accepting systems, such as the liberal traditions where the individual
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can gain access to the external world solely through reason, for such are opposite to the
Mexican idiosyncrasy.
3.2 A Mexican National Philosophy?
It can be argued that good ideas are not dependent upon nationality. I agree, however,
that in this case the axiom may not apply because as Levinas proposes, as has been
emphasized through this treatise, objective reason is not the ultimate truth giver of the world.
The ethical duty of protecting other people is superior to reason. Allow me to offer an example
to clarify my position. Imagine that you are in a group of people being held as hostages and the
only means of gaining freedom is to put one in the group to death. Under a rational ethical
system, the solution is simple; let him die, so the rest can live. This seems valid. However, I
argue that there are some problems with this statement. First, why is it automatically assumed
that the other is the one who has to die, so that we can live? Why do not we think I will die, so
you can live? If that is the premise, would we still agree with the solution? Second, even if we
are willing to randomly choose a person to die, so as to be fair to all, it may be the case that by
doing so we will have lost an essence of being human: the capacity to feel compassion for
another’s pain as ours. In other words, if we do not protect the life of the other in the same
way we would our own, we may be losing the very meaning of life, at least as Levinas proposes
it.20 It can be argued that in that case, a person must offer his life in order to save the others’
but that would equally be a life that is sacrificed. It may be the case then that the best possible
solution, not necessarily in terms of the number of lives, but as the ethical union with the
other to a point where were the I and the other are one is to take the risk and either fight back
or be willing to all die for the sake of solidarity with the other.
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Coming back to the idea of having external systems imposed in Mexican social
structure, liberal systems might have worked for other cultures but such was not the case for
Mexico because these systems did not take into account the fact that spirituality plays a vital
role in the Mexican conception of life. Caso supported the idea that Mexico’s spirituality
should be taken into account to adequately define the Mexican reality. Caso cautioned to
“distrust those who want to impose on the concrete and living reality of a native country, the
love of a hypothetical race; distrust, above all, those who boasting of a false humanity,
propose to deny their Patria” (PMIN 78). For Caso “la patria es primero”21 does not mean an
obsessed irrational nationalism, but the natural consequence of inferring that Mexico is the
immediate reality Mexicans have to deal with, so when they describe this reality they need to
do it with a clear vision of what this reality is. By serving Mexico, their immediate reality, they
are also serving humanity. It is important to notice that he did not advocate for a fixed idea of
what it means to be Mexican, but on the contrary he wanted Mexicans to have wings as far as
there is lead. In other words, he wanted Mexicans to have ideals, insomuch as they were
immersed in daily reality, in the immediate reality, in Mexican reality.22

At first this idea of having the Patria as necessary may seem a point of variance
between Levinas and Caso, but for Levinas dependence on other members of the community
is important to fully develop our personhood. Caso shares this concept. He similarly asserted
that it is only through society that a person can find her realization, but this society must be a
natural reflection of the interest of the persons that make up the community. If the members
of the community are forced or convinced to adopt a persona that does not correspond to
their historical process they will not be able to develop their potentiality for they will be
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limited by a feeling of inferiority. Caso argues that the complex of inferiority that Mexicans
had, came from the logical impossibility to meet standards that do not correspond to
Mexicans. These standards, among others, are the skin color, the physical constitution, and
more important the vision of the cosmos. In addition to this, it was the pattern of choosing a
social model and when they start to domain, a new model is imported, and the learning
process has to start all over again. These conditions created an environment of frustration and
sense of inferiority for they could barely reach what seems to be natural in other people. I
altogether with Caso sustain, that in fact that is the problem, other countries have followed
their historical process to determinate their national identity, while for Mexicans this process
has been broken several times. In some occasions it has been broken by conquers, but some
other times by a national elite that in order to keep their power and dominance over the
majority of the Mexican people have pushed, convinced or forced Mexicans to disbelief their
identity failing in this way to their ethical duty of protecting the other. It is extremely
important to notice that Caso’s point is not that Mexicans are inferior, but that they feel
inferior. Mexicans have as many problems as any other developing country, but also has a rich
cultural identity and a promise to deliver a past and a future that needs to be reconciled in
order to progress as a nation that is able to protect its people. Thus, in order to break this
circle they need to enhance the knowledge of themselves.

Since Caso proposes that the basis of knowledge starts with one’s immediate reality, it
might seem problematic, as Levinas proposes a face to face relationship, rather than a system.
However, I uphold that, as established before, in order to become a fully developed person we
need to recognize, accept, and embrace our dependence with the other members of our
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community. In order for this dependence to not become detrimental, we need to have
knowledge of the persons whom surround us, as well as where we are coming from. We need
to recognize our culture and past. A good approach to doing so is through a common effort
that later gets transformed into plenty of personal expressions. If we do not reconcile
ourselves with the past, we will not be able to develop our identity and without an identity we
will not be able to question the I, for we will be only a reflection of its categories. The Other, in
this case Mexican nationals, need first to find a common identity and later an individual visage
to question the I based on the personal expectative, and no one else’s. This analogous
knocking on the I’s door may not be to ask for bread, but rather to show him what he is losing
by ignoring the Mexican reality; to question his values and notion of life based on personal
contact.
This national identity does not come from an idealization of what to be a Mexican is,
rather comes from the ethical interaction with the other; an interaction where people have
moved from being merely an individual to a point where he has personality. Antonio Caso
qualifies personality as the “world of irreducible spiritual being” (HPTS 45). It is the
instantiation of the universal in a unique being that can be related to the intentionality that
Husserl designated as the symbol of human superiority, which Levinas rejects for considering it
an attempt to totalize the world. This risk was already apparent in 1940 when Caso cautioned
against the systematization that contemporary society had been involved in. Society needs to
accept the existing inequality rather than an impossible uniformity. In order to achieve this
goal we need not ask the masses23, but the persons that have a unique personality capable of

50

conquering both society and nature by themselves. This would ideally lead to the two later
joining forces in equal conditions to better shape the world.
3.3 Persons and Society
Caso studies this relation between society and the individual and reaches the
conclusion that there must be an equal worth for a society that tyrannizes man, forgets their
humanity, forgets that they are not only biological entities, and one that recognizes it is
composed of organic beings, centers of culture. Then there is the individual, who conceives
himself as complete in the sense that his reality neglects the value that culture has in his
existence. Doing such causes one to be reduced to the level where primary concerns consist in
personal and bodily needs. We need to remember that an individual does not demonstrate his
personhood through the exercise of the will in relation to other members of the community.
Without culture, an individual is only a self‐centered unit that in his absolute freedom does not
find means to exercise the will, and is therefore lost in the sea of indeterminacy.24
For a person to actualize his freedom he needs to participate in the genesis of culture
where valuable experiences are synthesized. It is important to notice that this culture is not
just a mere reflection of what a particular generation upholds, but rather is an accumulation of
history in a specific moment in time. History is reflected in the experiences that a person has in
the world, through contact with others. Both Levinas and Caso make the point that the history
we share with other human beings impels our want for a moral and physical solidarity with
them. This want leads us to generate a culture that is not just inherently platonic, but that
becomes part of the physical realm by being experienced for as I have stressed, ideas must
have correspondence in the world.
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Caso makes a good observation when he points out that the goal of solidarity is not
achievable by social movements that only redistribute wealth. This is not sufficient for there is
no love involved. I do not mean solely love of material wealth, but more so that which stems
from establishing human ties. The love and respect for the disadvantaged other that is able to
ultimately create a better world compels us to learn from the Other by engaging in an honest
exchange of ideas and experiences that contributes more to the well‐being of both, exclusive
of material wealth. This is not to say that material possessions are not necessary because as
Levinas points out one of the I’s duties to the Other is to help him to be self sufficient. Rather,
the problem stems from the emphasis that capitalist societies place on materialistic means as
assessing the value of a person. Such appraisal cannot begin to account for the infinite
possibilities of human expression.
Caso elaborates when he says, “A person is not a factum; rather he is the possible
direction of a process, and at the same time a task, an eternal luminous goal that hovers above
natural man. Man is rebirth” (HPTS 48). Here, Antonio Caso’s thought is comparable to
Levinas’ idea of man’s infinitude. A person is not a fixed concept, where he needs to direct all
his efforts to achieve the goal of perfection that has been set for him. This cannot be as there
is not such an ideal concept of perfection. The concept is rooted in what older generations
have thought correct, but it is also subject to the contributions that newer generations ascribe.
Caso proposes an inward process where human beings return to themselves as an
approach for salvation. However, this position must not be confused with a call for isolation.
Caso recognizes that a person’s actualization is only attainable in the encounter and creation
of society. Subjective and therefore vague values do not make a significant contribution to
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people. Caso’s recommendation is a call for persons to see that “one is the work and agent of
one’s own will, capable of one’s own substantiality” (48). It is only when a person makes an
effort to instantiate his abilities that he realizes the limits individualization has imposed upon
him. Thereafter he should work on the development of his own personality and find the
unique characteristics that establish him as a person, and not just an individual. Each
instantiation of personhood is singularly unique; it is not reducible to some other person’s
concepts such as science or the categories that another person wants to enforce. Now we
have a strong ethical base established, we can move to hear the voice of the other.
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Chapter IV: The Other as a Form of Resistance
In order to understand my use of the other, it is important to make a clear distinction
between the non‐I and the other. I will define the non‐I as the person who is not the I, but
does not have a significant divergence to the I in terms of culture, ideology or mind set. He is
just a person different to the I. However, since they have agreed for the most part in what kind
of life project they want to have there is not a large difference between them. The non‐I then
does not represent a questioning to the I. Allow to present an example. In a community of
philosophers where all of them have concurred that philosophy is the place and language to be
used in order to solve the matters that are present in life they represent not the other but the
non‐I to each other. Even when there are different philosophy traditions, they still have strong
ties such as logic and the belief in language as a solving‐problem tool. These similarities make
easy to set all of them in a distinct group that could be considered the opposite to people
whom do not consider that thinking things through is necessary to have a well‐rounded life.
This group of people is the other to the philosophers as well as philosophers is the other to the
non‐reflexive people. As we can infer, at difference of the non‐ I, the other represents what the
I has not understood or even attempted to understand.
Even when I have claimed that otherness exists in relation to the level of similarities
between one person and other, I will add that it can be said that most, if not all, societies have
a system that clearly separates Is from others. It is important to notice that as we move to a
global society these distinctions between cultures are being eroded, and some times plainly
substituted by an exclusive society where differences are not promoted. This situation can be
clearly seen in the warning that David Harrison of Swarthmore College in Pennsylvania made
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when he said that "There are fewer languages than there were a month or six months ago…
Human languages are literally disappearing as we speak." (HLFEC) It is in this context that the
other becomes essential to maintain diversity in our lives. Allow me then to elaborate more on
the idea of the other.
I am defining the other as the person who refuses to surrender his identity to
mainstream culture whatever that mainstream culture is (i.e. Capitalist, Communist, Buddhist,
Christian, etc). In other words, he would oppose any system that pretends to totalize him by
setting him into categories that cannot fully capture his human potential or limits his right to
question and express himself in a way where he is able to fully develop his identity. This
identity is rich in experiences that set him in contact with an alternative reality to the one that
is presented to him by mainstream culture. He actively looks to exchange ideas and
experiences with people with an opposite mind set for he knows that it is the best way to learn
together how to build a better community. The other is not afraid to question the status quo
to point out the failures in a system that obligates people to obey it and restrains them.
Neither is he afraid of establishing a conversation and collaboration with the system in the
points that are of common interest for if he rejected the idea of having a conversation with the
members of mainstream culture he will be doing the same mistake they do: denying the
existence of other ways of thinking that may contribute with something of value to the
formation of a richer human reality.
The other resists giving away his freedom to get some material assessment, even
though he recognizes the value of them and does not look to be a martyr, but a person that
also appreciate other activities such as art, music, or social relations. In fact, he prefers to be
55

actualized in his interaction with the community; a community where he considers himself at
home. He rejects any superior order, whatever it is called spirit, state or corporation, because
his freedom is instantiated in the interaction with other people, where there is not room for
an absolute and totalize I that some systems pretends to promote. It is important to notice
that even when the community is the place where his freedom is actualized, it is not given by
the community itself. A community has not coercion power over the person other than its
capacity to be attractive enough for him. Freedom, in other words is not given by an external
entity, but is to be exercised within a community that the individual willfully wants to join and
help to develop. This community is made up of the social interactions that persons, without
losing their own identities, have. These interactions create an almost dialectical relation
between individuals and society that helps all parties involved to achieve their goals.
I call the other to the person with courage to resist the influence of the I. The other
absolutely refuses standardized societies, because he does not think that the options that
mainstream society offers him will help him to actualize his freedom. For the very word
standardized sound like something that imposes limits to his freedom. They are ready to face
the consequences of not being part of a system. In fact, for them, this situation is beneficial
because in this way they are not obligated to be part of a system that they think is oppressive.
These others are ready to form small communities where democracy is made face to face, so
there is no place to hide from the community, and abuse it in subtle ways. Whatever they
decide to do is made clear, for there is nothing to hide. They find their actualization in the
community, in the very existence of other persons, and the other persons at the same time
find their freedom in them too.
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Allow me to be very clear in this point; I am not saying that community gives him an
identity, for that would be an external entity. I am claiming, in agreement with Caso and
Levinas, that the other is defined by the ethical encounter of the persons who build a strong
community. In other words, the other has desires and projects by his own; however, he looks
for a community where he can actualize his freedom. He feels free to leave the community
anytime it becomes oppressive and interferes with his freedom, for as we have said before he
does not depend on the community to have an identity. If for some reason a person or a group
of people wants to take over the community he will defend it, but if he cannot do it, either by
indifference of the community of conflict of interests, he will move away and look for another
community where he can be free.
The communities that others form are not isolated for other communities; in fact they
are in continuous contact between them. These communities are interconnected through the
individuals that participate in different organizations, via delegates who attend congress or
reunions within them and by the personal contacts that a person has with other people. These
encounters are given through collaborative events they organize or in a local level in the day a
day construction of a better community. These organizations, go from Zapatistas, Via
Campesina, Animal rights organizations, to local collectives, etc, They respect their identities,
and are not to take over power to dictate people what to do; doing that will be against their
principles of personal freedom. They are able to organize themselves and learn from different
forms of resistance.
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End Notes
1 In his Philosophy of Right, Hegel describes the master‐slave relationship as based in a
dialectical relationship where after a fight to the death, the slave is ruled by master. However,
due the dependence that the master gets to have on the slave, the latter becomes the master.
This cycle is repeated through history. In Levinas’ conception, because his nature. In other
words the other never gets to dominate the I.
2 The conflict has been documented by several national and international newspapers as “La
Jornada” “Proceso” and a number of human rights organizations such as Amnesty
International at a word level. To get the background of this conflict, offer support and see
updates of the conflict the reader can refer to:
http://www.alertalomasdelpoleo.blogspot.com/
3 I thank Dr. Simon for pointing out this reference in a conversation we had, my last semester
of my MA program: Spring 2009.
4 It is worth noting the difference between Ethical Relativism and Cultural Relativism that Ann
Kingsolver makes in her essay “Thinking and Acting Ethically in Anthropology”. She says that
“[anthropologists] do not personally agree with every practice we study as anthropologists.
Ethical relativism, in which a person suspends judgment on cultural practices and believes they
are all equally valid, is separate from cultural relativism, in which a culture is not judged as
good or bad but is understood using its own framework” (TA 80).
5 Even when the aesthetic aspect is very important to achieve a worth living life, due to the
extent and nature of the present work I will focus only on the ethical dimensions of this
relationship and leave the aesthetic value for a later work.
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6 Dr. Plotskovosky, a Physics professor at The University of Texas at El Paso, explains how it is
that even with is natural limitations our brain can give us an accurate picture of the world. He
says that our brain has cognitive access to some fragments of the universe, however, this is
enough because it can process that information in the same way we see the pattern of a piece
of wall paper and we can have a fair conception of how the pattern completes itself.
7 Faber Martin is author of major works in Phenomenology as Naturalism and Subjectivism,
and founder of the Philosophy and Phenomenological Society.
8 At difference of the bing‐bang, the Popol Vuh, the creation Mayan myth says that human
beings were created for the Gods so human beings can worship the Gods.
9 The problems of having a naturalized Ethics are beyond the scope of this essay. However
they have been largely discussed among others by James Blair.
10 There are some formal systems that allow contradictions, but because their low
explanation power, we will ignore them.
11 In his book Against Method Paul Feyerabend makes an interesting challenge to the
objectivity of Science. He says that even when the answers to the questions are obtained in an
objective, methodic way; the questions are made by a person, so they are influenced by his
culture.
12 Antonio Caso, Samuel Ramos and José Vasconcelos met each other in the Ateneo de la
juventud. Even when they had very different personalities, they fought together against the
cientificos. He also was one of the ideologists of the Mexican revolution.
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13 Antonio Caso died in 1946, and the peak of his philosophy was early XX century, while
Levinas’ Totality and Infinity was published in 1961.
14 Antonio Caso, Samuel Ramos and José Vasconcelos met each other in Ateneo de la
juventud. Even when they had very different personalities they fought together against the
cientificos. He also was one of the ideologists of the revolution.
15 Samuel Ramos, besides partnering with Caso and Vasconcelos against the noble dictator
Porfirio Diaz, wrote Perfil del hombre y la cultura en Mexico, one the first and more important
attempts to understand what it is to be a Mexican, a book that inspired Octavio Paz to write El
laberinto de la soledad,. This book would give its author a Noble prize and the third one to
Mexico, meeting Caso and Ramos’ desire of having Mexico playing a more important role in
the world.
16 Cientificos were a group of Mexican intellectuals led by Gabino Barreda who supported
Porfirio Diaz and Comte’s positivism.
17 As it is known, also Hegel presents this idea in the first chapter of Philosophy of Right.
18 The idea belongs to Friedrich Nietzsche of whom Caso was an admirer.
19 John H. Haddox has been a professor of philosophy at the University of Texas at El Paso for
more than fifty years. He introduced Latin American philosophy to American Academia. His
work has been continued by Carlos Sanchez, a philosophy professor at the University of San
Jose State University.
20 The solution of this dilemma is far from the scope of this thesis. However, there is plenty of
literature about these issues for the reader interested in this dilemma.
21 Homeland comes first.
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22 In the early twentieth century Mexican nationals did not travel often. If a person was born
in a place he would likely stay there for most of his life.
23 Ortega y Gasset explores more this idea in La rebelión de las masas by saying that mass
people are not persons any more for they have lost their uniqueness to become just one
figure.
24 This idea is developed in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right.
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